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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES ARE IM-
MUNE FROM TORT ACTIONS. Simmons First National Bank v. Thomp-
son, 285 Ark. 275, 686 S.W.2d 415 (1985).
Employees and representatives of deceased employees brought a
tort action for personal injuries and wrongful death against supervisory
employees of International Paper Company. Separate crews at the pa-
per mill had allowed different chemicals to enter the mill's sewer sys-
tem. Two chemicals intermingled in the sewer system and combined to
form a poisonous gas. The gas escaped through an open grate sewer
covering, resulting in the deaths of two employees and injury to other
employees. Plaintiffs alleged that the mill manager, the pulp mill su-
perintendent, the superintendent of engineering, and the supervisor of
safety negligently failed to discharge their duty to make the premises
safe.
The Jefferson County Circuit Court granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment on the ground that Arkansas's workers' com-
pensation statute provides immunity for personal liability to supervisory
employees. The court reasoned that workers' compensation is an exclu-
sive remedy against an employer and that supervisory employees are
protected by this same immunity. Thus, the circuit court concluded
that plaintiffs were entitled only to workers' compensation awards.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, af-
firmed the circuit court. The supreme court looked to both Professor
Larson and other jurisdictions for guidance. Larson contends that
workers' compensation should be the exclusive remedy for accidents
arising out of employment and involving people engaged in the same
employment.' The court followed this viewpoint and the majority of
recent decisions in other jurisdictions and held that supervisory employ-
ees are immune under workers' compensation laws for failure to pro-
vide a safe work place. Simmons First National Bank v. Thompson,
285 Ark. 275, 686 S.W.2d 415 (1985).
Historically, the increase of industrial injuries and the decrease in
available remedies at the end of the nineteenth century set the stage for
a radical change in the employer's liability for injuries incurred by his
employees.2 Prior to the enactment of workers' compensation statutes,
the common law compelled workers to accept dangerous employment at
1. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.20 (1985).
2. Id. § 5.20.
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their own risk or face possible starvation.$ Employers relied on the
common law defenses of the fellow servant rule, assumption of the risk,
and contributory negligence to escape liability."
Various policies led to the enactment of workers' compensation
statutes in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century and
well into the twentieth century.5 Casualties and serious injuries had be-
come inherent features of industrial development.6 In addition, it was
recognized that the industrial employer closely controlled the work
place and made most of the decisions concerning safety.7 It became
obvious that the burden of increased industrial accidents must be borne
by some segment of society.8 Since consumers benefited the most from
industrialized products, they were the most appropriate group to bear
this burden.9 The employers' position in the market system allowed
them to easily transfer the cost of industrial injury and death to the
consumer.10 Furthermore, for economic efficiency, a simple, prompt,
cheap, and non-litigious procedure seemed desirable." The most logical
solution to these policy concerns was a workers' compensation system.'
By 1910, the movement for workers' compensation statutes had
grown in the United States.13 Workers' compensation became firmly
entrenched in our legal system by 1916 when the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of New York's workers' com-
pensation statute."' By 1920, all but eight states had enacted workers'
compensation laws, and all the states had workers' compensation laws
by 1949.15
The typical workers' compensation statute provides benefits re-
gardless of fault to employees who suffer injury arising "out of and in
the course of" employment. 6 In exchange for assured but modest com-
pensation, employees waive their common law right to sue their
3. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (5th ed. 1984).
4. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 4.30.
5. Warnbaugh, Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Their Constitutionality,
25 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1911).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 2.20.
9. Id.
10. Wambaugh, supra note 5, at 131.
11. Id. at 131-32.
12. Wambaugh, supra note 5.
13. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 5.20.
14. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916).
15. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 5.30.
16. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.10.
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employer."7
In conjunction with workers' compensation statutes, some states,
including Arkansas, enacted third-party statutes that allow an em-
ployee injured during the course of employment to sue persons other
than the employer.1 8 In states with third-party statutes, determining
who qualifies as a third party can be a critical issue.19
Most courts have treated coemployees as third parties under these
statutes.20 In King v. Cardin,"' the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
a negligent coemployee qualified as a third person under the state's
third-party statute,2 and therefore was liable for injuries he negligently
caused to a fellow employee.23 The court reasoned that Arkansas'
workers' compensation statute2 4 is an exclusive remedy, but that it only
bars suits against the employer.25 As a general rule, only express statu-
tory language can pre-empt common law rights, 26 but a few jurisdic-
tions interpret similar workers' compensation statutes as immunizing
coemployees as well as employers. Since a laborer probably has no
resources other than those derived from his own employment, suits
against coemployees are often futile.28 Suing supervisory employees ap-
pears to be a viable option.
The courts take three basic approaches to the personal liability of
supervisory employees.2" In Brown v. Estess,30 the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that the employer's workers' compensation immunity ex-
tends to both coemployees and supervisory employees as long as the
17. Id.
18. Ehrhardt, The Third Party Action-Expanding the Circle of Immunity: Coemployees,
48 Miss. L.J. 87, 93 (1977). The Arkansas statute is ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1340 (1976).
19. Comment, Third Party Actions Under the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act, 26
ALA. L. REv. 701, 709 (1974).
20. Ehrhardt, supra note 18, at 94.
21. 229 Ark. 929, 319 S.W.2d 214 (1959).
22. Id. at 933, 319 S.W.2d at 218.
23. Id.
24. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1304 (1976) provides: "The rights and remedies herein granted to
an employee ... on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies
of such employee ... to recover damages from such employer on account of such injury or death
25. 229 Ark. at 933, 319 S.W.2d at 218.
26. Marquez v. Rapid Harvest Co., 1 Ariz. App. 562, 563-64, 405 P.2d 814, 816-17 (1965);
Frantz v. McBee Co., 77 So. 2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1955).
27. See, e.g., White v. Ponozzo, 77 Idaho 276, 291 P.2d 843 (1955) (coemployec was the
employer's agent; therefore, the coemployee shared the employer's immunity).
28. Ehrhardt, supra note 18, at 103.
29. State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1982).
30. 374 So. 2d 241 (Miss. 1979).
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negligent employee acts within the scope of employment."1 The case
involved a wrongful death suit against a board of directors and a gen-
eral manager for their negligence in allowing an employee to suffocate
to death in a soybean bin. The court reasoned that employees should
not bear the burden of work-related accidents, but that the employer
should pass the cost along to the consumer.32 The court in Brown chose
to follow the purpose and social philosophy of workers' compensation
and make workers' compensation the exclusive remedy against the em-
ployer or any of its employees. 3 The court stated that holding employ-
ees liable for another employee's injury would defeat the purpose of the
statute. It would place the cost of employment accidents on employees
rather than on the consumer. 4
A New Jersey court followed a second approach and relied on the
reasoning of the Restatement of Agency in determining supervisory
employee immunity. In Miller v. Muscarelle,3 5 a construction worker
was killed when a conveyor collapsed at a work site. The administratrix
brought suit against the foreman, construction manager, and president
of the company for wrongful death. The Superior Court of New Jersey
held that supervisory employees were personally liable for injury to
other employees only if the supervisory employees breached a specific
duty that their employer had assigned to them.36 The court reasoned
that if supervisory employees do not breach their duty to their em-
ployer, then they act as agents and share their employer's immunity?7
A "capacity" theory provides the basis for a third approach to the
liability of supervisory employees.3 8 In Kerrigan v. Errett,3" the Su-
preme Court of Iowa held that a supervisory employee who breaches a
personal duty to an employee, as opposed to a duty of employment,
becomes liable for personal injuries.40 Thus, a supervisor acting in the
capacity of a coemployee assumes personal liability for injury to other
employees.' 1 But when a supervisor negligently performs the employer's
31. Id. at 242-43.
32. Id. at 242; see also Madison v. Pierce, 156 Mont. 209, 478 P.2d 860 (1970).
33. Brown, 374 So. 2d at 242.
34. Id. at 243.
35. 67 N.J. Super. 305, 170 A.2d 437 (1961) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 350-59 (1958)).
36. Miller, 67 N.J. Super. at 333, 170 A.2d at 452.
37. Id. at 329-30, 170 A.2d at 450.
38. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d at 179.
39. 256 N.W.2d 394 (Iowa 1977).
40. Id. at 397 (citing Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716, 721 (La. 1973)).
41. See Laffin v. Chemical Supply Co., 77 Wis. 2d 353, 253 N.W.2d 51 (1977).
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duty, he receives immunity.' 2 For example, in Pitrowski v. Taylor,'s
the case was remanded to determine whether a supervisor breached a
personal duty when a piece of steel fell from a forklift operated by the
supervisor and caused injury to an employee. Similarly, in Wilson v.
Hasvold,4 a president of a construction company breached a personal
duty when he negligently operated a caterpillar tractor.
Often, courts using the "capacity" theory describe employers' du-
ties as nondelegable." For example, the duty of the employer to use
diligence in selecting competent employees constitutes a nondelegable
duty.' 6 In Blumhardt v. Hartung,47 the Supreme Court of South Da-
kota held that a supervisory employee is immune from personal liability
for actions within his corporate responsibility.' Similarly, other courts
have held that the duty to provide safe working conditions and general
supervision is also a nondelegable duty of the employer, and therefore,
supervisory employees are immune from tort liability for breaching
that duty. 9
The Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the issue of supervisory
immunity in Simmons First National Bank v. Thompson. 0 The court
prefaced its decision by noting that the issue of supervisory immunity
under workers' compensation is one of first impression in Arkansas.5 1
The court noted that other states with third-party statutes similar to
Arkansas' consider a coemployee a third party.52 Previously, the court
had denied immunity for a fellow employee in King v. Cardin5" on the
basis that a coemployee qualifies as a third party under the Arkansas
statute. However, the court ruled in Neal v. Oliver,5 4 that an employer
is not subject to liability as a third party even though he is also the
manager and supervisor of the business he owns. The court in Simmons
First National Bank pointed out that the liability of supervisory em-
42. Id.
43. 55 Wis. 2d 615, 201 N.W.2d 52 (1972).
44. 86 S.D. 286, 194 N.W.2d 251 (1972).
45. See, e.g., Athas v. Hill, 54 Md. App. 293, 458 A.2d 859 (1983).
46. Id.
47. 283 N.W.2d 229 (S.D. 1979).
48. Id. at 232.
49. Laffin v. Chemical Supply Co., 77 Wis. 2d 353, 253 N.W.2d 51 (1977); Kruse v.
Schieve, 61 Wis. 2d 421, 213 N.W.2d 64 (1973), appeal after remand, 72 Wis. 2d 126, 240
N.W.2d 159 (1976).
50. 285 Ark. 275, 686 S.W.2d 415 (1985).
51. Id. at 276, 686 S.W.2d at 416.
52. Id. at 277, 686 S.W.2d at 417.
53. 229 Ark. at 933, 319 S.W.2d at 218.
54. 246 Ark. 377, 438 S.W.2d 313 (1969).
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ployees falls somewhere between situations covered by the King and
Neal decisions.55
The court reasoned that Professor Larson would deny liability in
Simmons First National Bank.56 According to Larson, errors in work-
ers' compensation cases usually arise when courts fail to realize that
workers' compensation is not a tort action.57 The test for liability
should be whether the injury is "work-connected." 58 The court pointed
to the fact that even though states have not expanded immunity to the
extent Professor Larson advocates, a majority of jurisdictions have
reached Larson's conclusion with regard to immunity for supervisory
employees.59 Since employers are immune from liability for negligently
failing to provide a safe work place, the court reasoned that the same
immunity should extend to supervisory employees when their general
duties involve providing a safe work place.60
The court stated several policy reasons for its decision. If supervi-
sory employees are held personally liable, then they will demand that
their employer provide indemnification.61 As a result, the employer will,
in essence, have no immunity.62 The court said the purpose of workers'
compensation is to shift the cost of work-related injuries to the con-
sumer.6" Workers gave up the unlimited damages available in a fault
system in exchange for limited recovery based on "no fault."" The
court concluded that plaintiffs in Simmons First National Bank were
attempting to recover against their supervisors on the basis of fault
while retaining their right to assured recovery under workers' compen-
sation. 65 Therefore, the court held against the plaintiffs and granted
immunity to the supervisory employees.66
Simmons First National Bank is the first case in which the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court has held that the workers' compensation statute
provides immunity to supervisory employees. The court refused to hold
supervisory employees liable in tort for their failure to provide a safe
work place. Nevertheless, even after Simmons First National Bank,
55. 285 Ark. at 277, 686 S.W.2d at 417.
56. Id.
57. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.20.
58. Id. § 2.10.
59. 285 Ark. at 278, 686 S.W.2d at 417.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1982)).
62. Id.
63. 285 Ark. at 278-79, 686 S.W.2d at 417.
64. Id. at 279, 686 S.W.2d at 417.
65. Id. at 279, 686 S.W.2d at 417-18.
66. Id. at 279, 686 S.W.2d at 418.
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the boundaries of supervisory employee immunity remain unclear. As
the court stated, Larson's policy arguments support supervisory immu-
nity in all work-related accidents. Moreover, Larson's policy arguments
also support coemployee immunity. However, the court impliedly re-
jected Larson's view on liability of coemployees and reaffirmed that co-
employees could be personally liable.67
The court also relied on cases from other jurisdictions that have
adopted the "capacity theory" of supervisory liability.68 The "capacity
theory" gives supervisory employees immunity for negligent acts they
commit in their roles as supervisors. Whether the court will extend im-
munity to a supervisor performing in the capacity of a coemployee is
still an open question.
The policy arguments in Simmons First National Bank could also
be used to support supervisory employee immunity when the supervisor
is acting as a coemployee as well. On the other hand, the court may
continue to follow the majority of decisions and rely on the capacity
theory. If Arkansas fully adopts the "capacity theory," a supervisory
employee could be held personally liable for negligent acts performed
in the capacity of a coemployee. It would seem inherently unfair to
treat supervisory employees and coemployees differently for the same
negligent act.
Hank Jackson
61?. Id. at 279, 686 S.W.2d at 417.
68. Id.
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